Introduction
Much attention is focused on the use of 'soft power' and specifically how sports events are used by nations to generate a more benevolent global image. Modern nation states are increasingly developing their own particular 'soft power' activities, drawing upon different resources and have different audiences in mind. Until relatively recently, the state of Israel was preoccupied with its military security and paid little attention to cultural politics. However, because of the military dominance of Israel other 'battlegrounds' have emerged. Academic research on soft power and sport has traditionally focused on high profile events (such as the FIFA World Cup finals and Summer Olympic Games). This paper spotlights an international sports event which, although relatively small and usually attracting limited interest from the mainstream media, when held in Israel, highlights regional politics, the role of UEFA/FIFA and becomes part of a wider debate over international public opinion. Grix and Himpler (2007) identified how the United States used soft power as an alternative to its military activities and to counter its negative image post-2003 Iraq war, something that echoes Germany's use of sport to address the legacy of its Third Reich (Grix and Houlihan, policy-makers. The focus shifted to one which cultivated wider public opinion by promoting positive images and values with engaged media 'pundits' and a broader public in an attempt to engender greater legitimacy. Whilst Nye (2004:2) explained soft power as an option to 'attract and co-opt' he acknowledged the continued role of hard power and its coercive strength to secure a desired outcome. Although still able to draw upon its hard power (i.e. military and economic strength), soft power would allow the US to utilise less tangible (but not necessarily less effective) resources to appeal more directly to the public in other countries. Combining military power and economic strength with soft power would produce 'smart power' which, according to Nye (2004:32) , would help maintain the dominance of the US as the global super power.
The early work on public diplomacy and soft power contained a strong bias towards a United
States worldview and has been challenged by those who question Nye's approach. The concept of soft power was criticized as containing an assumption that it will create a positive outcome for all parties. As Lepp and Gibson (2001, cited in Grix and Lee, 2013) have illustrated, soft power is used to draw attention away from any number of negative issues such as war, terrorism, poverty, gender inequalities, unemployment, crime and corruption, and poor standards in education and healthcare. While it is seen as a preferable form of diplomacy for the 21st century, Falk (2012) has argued that significant power still resides in the use of hard power (i.e. military) and economics such as financial loans and / or membership of political institutions (EU, WTO, NATO etc). As Grix and Lee (2013: 526) have noted, 'neither Nye nor other "soft power" scholars tend to spend much time pondering who decides exactly what "attractive" is in international relations. ' The growing use of soft power may be seen to reflect the gradual economic and military decline of the US. The ultimate aim of soft power is not necessarily benign as its normative bias can be seen as promoting US institutions, its particular approach to democracy, its popular culture and -by association -its underpinning ideology. As such, soft power can be interpreted as an exercise in the continuation of US neo-liberalism, its imperialist ambitions and a continued disregard for any genuine move towards a post-colonial agenda for self-determination.
Sports events and soft power
Recent years have seen significant interest in the political instrumentality associated with staging international sports events with nation states investing in staging mega-events using a rationale of 'urban regeneration' and / or 'place branding.' High profile sports events have become highly sought-after commodities (Nauright, 2004) and are increasingly being used to establish a global identify and / or improve a nation's international public image (Hall, 1989; 1992; Grix and Lee, 2013) . As Horne (2007) and Roche (2000) have identified, sports megaevents have become an exemplary means to transmit promotional messages to a global audience. As signifiers of modernity which embody and reflect neo-liberal policies (Hall, 2006) , Jackson (2013) has discussed 'the contested terrain of sports diplomacy in a globalising world' with Manzenreiter (2010) identifying an emerging discourse that identifies the abstract and intangible benefits of hosting mega-events.
As Grix and Lee (2013: 527) Winter Olympic Games are the established sport mega-events, with the secondary tier of sports events equally sought-after by smaller nation states (these include the IAAF and FINA Championships, the Pan American Games, Commonwealth Games, Asian Games, the African Cup of Nations, the UEFA Champions League final, F1 races, ICC and Rugby Union finals).
Although smaller in scale and media interest, these events are accessible to those countries which (due to their size) would not be able to host a mega-event. Although the Men's U-21 tournament is one such event which does not attract extensive media or public interest, it is organised by UEFA/FIFA and therefore carries a level of prestige not found in many other sports events. Grix and Lee (2013) identified a number of sports mega-events (e.g. South Africa, 2010 FIFA World Cup; China, 2008 Olympic Games; India, 2010 Commonwealth Games; Russia, 2014 Winter Olympics; and forthcoming, Russia, 2018 FIFA World Cup; Qatar, 2022 FIFA World Cup) where the host nation has sought to exploit their hosting of the event to improve its international image (see also Grix and Houlihan, 2013) . Cornelissen (2008) has shown how South Africa attempted this by hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup and whilst Alegi (2008) has shown how sports politics and diplomacy were expressions of soft power in a South African context. Manzenreiter (2010) identified how international stereotypes and misconceptions were difficult barriers to overcome for those nations seeking to change their global image, with Brannagan and Giulianotti (2014) identifying how the Qatari state is seeking to distance itself from the region's wider socio-political issues by hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup Finals.
When a national government decides to support hosting a major sports event, especially if it is seeking to address a negative international image, there are risks. This is particularly so for those states that already have a poor international reputation (Grix and Lee, 2013) . Such countries need to ensure the event is subject to careful 'impression management' if a positive image is to be created and presented and result in greater international political legitimacy for the host. The global communication processes which now operate (Grix and Lee, 2013) mean that extensive effort is needed to ensure the mainstream news media are 'on message' and give priority coverage to the 'positive' messages identified by the host. The host can influence individual journalists with 'junkets' and official tours and underpin this with the threat to withdraw press accreditation if they drift too far from the 'official script. ' The emergence of new / social media and the emergence of 'citizen journalism' (Hänska-Ahy and Shapour, 2013; Greer and McLaughlin, 2010) has led to an increase in distinctly 'off message' reporting which has embarrassed the hosts (such as the Formula 1 international motor races in Bahrain, 2012 -see Brown, 2013 . In many cases the legitimacy sought by the hosts can quickly diminish with Grix and Lee (2013) reporting of the event, and advocacy material issued by both 'sides' in the conflict, the paper identifies how a relatively small sports event can be seen as part of Israel's hasbara strategy and was designed to improve its international image. The discussion draws upon Manzenreiter's (2010) and Brannagan and Giulianotti (2014) observation that 'raising a state's profile is one thing; managing it is another' by examining the actions of both those who supported, and those opposed to, Israel hosting this event. Nygard and Gates' (2013) mechanism of sports diplomacy and politics (i.e. image building, building a platform for dialogue, trust building, reconciliation, integration and anti-racism) work is also used to inform an assessment of the contemporary landscape and how soft power is being used by both Israeli and Palestinian supporters. The aim of the paper is to navigate through these complex debates and examine Israel's hosting of an international sport event, the response of the Palestinians and the role played by the sport's governing bodies, specifically UEFA/FIFA.
Israel's hasbara strategy
The state of Israel was created and maintained through military power. Despite being victorious in many of its wars, most significantly in 1948, 1967 and 1973 ('it cannot afford to lose'), the two Palestinian Intifadas (1987-1993 and 2000-2005) have caused significant damage to Israel's international image. The two wars in Lebanon (1982 Lebanon ( -1985 Lebanon ( and 2006 ) and the occupation of territory since 1967, the isolation of (and repeated incursion into) the Gaza Strip, the building of the 'Peace Wall', and the continued construction of illegal settlements on the 'West Bank' have all increased international public criticism of the Israeli state. in English or in any other language. Israeli public diplomacy and the concept of hasbara have been defined variously as propaganda, whitewashing, explaining, information providing, public diplomacy, re-branding and overseas image-building (IFM, 2005; Ravid, 2012; Schulman, 2011; . The primary cause of Israel's poor international image has been seen as a failure of hasbara (i.e. 'to explain') rather than the actions of the state (Molad, 2012; Gilboa, 2006; . Originally a campaign co-ordinated by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, hasbara is currently coordinated by the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs (Blumenthal, 2013 (Molad, 2012: 24) . Professional staff are supported by volunteers with both parties accessing an 'Official Hasbara Handbook' to guide their activities across the mainstream and social media. According to Blumenthal (2013) -and continue to hold -a long-standing (for some pathological) hatred of the Jews (Klug, 2012; Tait, 2013; Weinthal, 2014 Sharansky, 2004) . Although this approach is acknowledged as lacking rigour (Molad, 2012) , it allows criticism of the Israeli state to be dismissed as anti-Semitic rather than anti-Zionist.
'Hasbara in action'
Each nation state has different resources available to advance their international public diplomacy efforts. This section discusses some of the resources available to Israel and how they coordinate their efforts through hasbara. Although Israel is a relatively small country (in terms of area and population), it has, for a variety of different reasons, access to resources to (Hayeem, 2010) . Those considering aliyah are guided towards locations within Israel proper, but also to areas around Jerusalem despite many of these settlements being on illegally annexed land and in direct violation of international law. 8 The Jewish Diaspora is a significant ambassadorial source of soft power for the Israeli state and allows it access to well-established social networks through Jewish cultural exchange programmes and specific hasbara programmes, many of which target US and European campuses (Blumenthal, 2013) . Campuses have become key sites in the struggle for public opinion with the Israeli government offering scholarships and 'fellowships' to those willing to actively promote Israel on campus -especially on social media (Bannoura, 2014) who advocate on behalf of the state of Israel, of 'Eretz Israel' 10 and specifically the city of Jerusalem (Bryant, 2013; Spector, 2008) . This 'faith-based diplomacy' has generated significant growth in Christian tourism, especially from developing countries such as Brazil, South Korea and Nigeria, states that have not traditionally supported Israel (Bryant, 2013) .
This particular form of diplomacy takes on greater resonance as the more progressive Christian groups and charities increasingly support the call for boycott, divestment and sanctions (Eleftheriou-Smith, 2014; Posner, 2014; Wyatt, 2014) .
In 2011 Tel Aviv was named the world's best gay tourist destination (Haaretz, 2012) . This award was a consequence of the international advertising campaign conducted by the Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs which promoted the country to the LGBTQ community as a modern, gay-friendly destination. Criticised as 'pinkwashing' (Schulman, 2011) does not directly involve itself but works through others, primarily the Israeli FA (IFA), but also through its broader hasbara operation (outline previously); ultimately, in matters relating to national security the Israeli state has the final word.
In the build-up to the tournament the English FA and German FA cooperated with IFA on a number of 'football for all' and anti-racist initiatives (Willenzik, 2013; Ynetnews, 2013) .
Staging the tournament was an opportunity for Israel to attract public and media interest 'for the right reasons' (Dann, 2013) to their U-21 players to wish them luck and to express hope that they enjoy their experience in
Israel, but not to make reference to anything political or the attempted boycott of this tournament (Lipan, 2013) . The tournament was promoted by the IFA, UEFA and the Israeli state as an opportunity to bring together diverse groups, to promote mutual respect and tolerance on and off the field and to portray the Israeli state as a democracy (Willenzik, 2013 ).
The Israeli U-21 squad contained six Israeli-Arab players (Taylor, 2013) (Shor and Yonay, 2010; Sorek, 2005; Beaumont, 2015) .
The main sports stadium in Gaza was hit by the IDF, who claiming it was being used to launch rockets, killed four youngsters playing football in the stadium (Ogden, 2012 Malian descent and a Muslim, launched a petition that initially claimed to include a number of high profile football players; however, when some players subsequently denied they had given their explicit support, Kanoute responded by stating that they had been told to distance themselves from the campaign (Ogden, 2012) . Immediately before the tournament began, ProPalestinian supporters staged a demonstration outside the UEFA Congress in London and disrupted a private dinner held for the UEFA delegates and invited guests (Warshaw, 2013) ; a further demonstration took place in Amsterdam on the eve of the UEFA Champions League
Final.
When Michel Platini met with pro-Palestine campaigners at FIFA headquarters he said he would 'think about' moving the tournament (Abunimah, 2013 (Palestinian Information Centre, 2010) .
Upon securing the tournament the IFA described the event as an 'amazing opportunity' to promote the country and its footballing community not just to Europe, but to a global audience (Sanderson and Hart, 2011) . The event would allow their national team to participate at the highest level and improve the country's infrastructure and raise expectations within Israeli football (Sanderson and Hart, 2011) . Prior to the tournament's first game UEFA announced that 100,000 tickets had been sold; this was seen as a marker of the tournaments 'success' given that the 2011 tournament (in Denmark) sold some 50,000 tickets (Daskal, 2013) . Average attendance was around 11,500 which was approximately 70% take-up of the total tournament capacity. A cumulative global audience of over 120 million followed the tournament via television, with 1.9m visits and 7.6m page views made to UEFA.com during the tournament; in addition some 100,000 fans linked to its U21 Facebook page and 9,000 followed its @UEFAUnder21 twitter account (UEFA, 2013) . At the end of the tournament Platini complimented the IFA for organising a successful tournament which saw no political violence or reports of demonstration within the country during the event; for Platini this vindicated UEFA's decision not to move the event. Platini stated that Israel had the same rights as the other 53 UEFA member nations to bid and host tournaments and that UEFA's decision had been 'to do what is good for football and not for politics' (Warshaw, 2013) .
Discussion
Securing the U-21 tournament was a major accomplishment for the Israeli state. Unlike those nations which have sought to use sports events to advance its economic growth, the priority for tournament claimed by UEFA and the IFA has given the latter greater influence within the former with the lack of protest within the country improving the country's potential to host future international sports events. 13 Although its size will limit its ability to host a truly megaevent, securing smaller international events will allow Israel to present itself as a 'normal' country and to gain greater acceptance in the international (sporting) community. players, something that gave the sporting boycott a particular resonance (Donnelly, 2008) .
Some claim that sanctions / boycott of Israeli science, technology, education and (non-sporting) culture would have a greater impact as these activities are more highly valued (Banks, 2013) .
Despite the trope that 'Jews don't like sport' a survey by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics showed the most common leisure activity was sport with Israeli men more engaged than women (55% compared to 24%) and watched more sports events (Lior, 2012) . In the season average attendance at Israeli Premier League games was ranked 22 nd across Europe.
According to Dann (2012) (Pilger, 2014; Yeuh, 2014) . Given the racist stereotype of the nonsporting / non-physical Jew (Dee, 2012; Klein 2000) 15 is just that, it is suggested that sport will continue to be a site for Israeli and Palestinian soft power activities.
However, excluding Israel from sports governing bodies and tournaments will have a more symbolic than economic impact on the country. While sport is not a substitute for the job of politicians, it is in a position to contribute to a programme of political, moral and cultural awareness-raising in the best tradition of public diplomacy and soft power. Soft power expressed through sports sanctions and / or a cultural / academic boycott are individually unlikely to make a significant impact on behaviour of the Israeli state. However, their cumulative impact on international public opinion has led the Israeli state to invest significantly in its hasbara apparatus. Sport can be used to introduce international audiences to the politics of the region and perhaps lead them to reflect on where they stand on the issue of Israel / Palestine. The next question would be whether they engage in the debate to better understand the issues and ultimately what, if any, action they chose to take.
This paper has identified how the Israeli state has an abundant range of soft power resources at its disposal and how this is underpinned and coordinated by its hasbara apparatus. However, using a sports event to cover-up its fundamental lack of human rights.
The Men's U-21 tournament is traditionally a 'small' event which rarely attracts much interest from the mainstream media and wider public. However, this particular tournament did have symbolic value in the context of Middle East politics and in the struggle for legitimacy sought by both Israel and Palestine. The football tournament, when located within Israel's wider hasbara efforts, has allowed for constructive discussion on the competing discourses associated with the soft power thesis. Whilst the Israeli state does not appear to be overtly interest in football they are increasingly cognisant of their international image and are using 'hasbara' -be this related to sport, tourism, culture, academic -to counter the growth of the BDS movement. This discussion has extended the findings of Manzenreiter (2010) and Brannagan and Giulianotti (2014) by demonstrating how Israel is seeking to differentiate itself from its
regional neighbours, to demonstrate that they are 'like their fellow Europeans' in their love of sport and that they are capable of successfully hosting an international sporting event.
When the international news media carry images of heavily armed Israeli security forces responding to peaceful, unarmed protestors or stone-throwing youngsters with tear gas, plastic and live bullets, discussion of soft diplomacy tends to fall away. Throughout its short history the Israeli state has responded aggressively to ensure its survival and shown little inhibition in using its hard (military) power; however, the landscape is changing and they have recognised they are facing a threat they cannot challenge exclusively via their military capability. The turn to hasbara to articulate their national interests has been necessary to confront the growing disquiet at its military actions. Likewise, the majority of Palestinians, having realised they cannot compete militarily with the Israeli state, have changed tactics by supporting the Intifadas and by making greater use of soft power. The global popularity of football makes it an attractive 'soft power' vehicle; thus the claim that sport and politics do not mix is little more than a hackneyed, nonsensical myth. Although 'sport' can be used to bring communities together, just because it is seen as 'soft' does not necessarily make it 'good.' What it can do is provide cover for inaction and the legitimisation of the status quo and unequal power relations.
Whilst both the Israelis and Palestinian (and their supporters) will claim success in terms of winning international public opinion, as Grix and Houlihan (2013:19) have noted "it is far more challenging to demonstrate a causal relationship between sport soft power initiatives and progress towards specific diplomatic objectives.' This paper has offered a critical assessment of the concept of soft power within the context of a relatively small international sporting event;
however, the imprecision and elusiveness of the base concept of soft power, makes it possible to identify only the immediate, but not the longer term, impact(s) of the staging the event. Soft power, in all its manifestations, is set to play an increasing role in the politics of the region with both the Israeli state and the Palestinian people using football to play out their aspirations.
